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A COMMENT ON JUDGE SELYA'S ARBITRATION 
UNBOUND?: THE LEGACY OF M c W O N  
Step hen J. Friedman' 
I should begin with the customary disclosure of my back- 
ground and prejudices in the area. I was a member of the Rud- 
er Task Force,' but the views expressed today are, of course, 
solely my own. While in private practice, I have not personally 
represented either plain- or defendants in securities arbi- 
trations. However, in my former lives as general counsel of a 
large retail securities £inn and of a large retail life insurance 
company, both of which mere substantial users of the arbitra- 
tion mechanism, I mas responsible for overseeing the defenses 
of a large number of arbitrations. Additionally, as an SEC 
Commissioner and later as Governor of the National Associa- 
tion of Securities Dealers ("NASDn), I had some responsibility 
for overseeing the arbitration process. 
I am fascinated by Judge Selya's analysis of Shearson1 
American Express, Im. v. McMahon2 and the competition be- 
fmeen our judicial system and the extensive and unique arbi- 
tral system that has grown up in the securities industry, large- 
ly under the auspices of the MASD. He concludes that most of 
the shortcomings that concerned the W i l h  v. Swan3 Court 
remain unresolved. Additionally, he sees a convergence of the 
fmo dispute resolution mechanisms. Judge Selya's gloomy con- 
clusion is that securities arbitrations are acquiring many of the 
most criticized aspects of civil litigation and that the judicial 
system is becoming more streamlined and efficient. This analy- 
01996 Stephen J. Friedman. AU Rights Reserved. 
Partner, Debevoise & Plimptan. 
See NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF SECURITIES DEALERS, SECUlWES ARBITRATION 
REFORM: REPORT OF THE A R B ~ T I O N  POLICY TASK FORCE (1996) [hereinafter 
TASK FORCE REPORT]. 
* 482 U.S. 220, reh'g denied, 483 U.S. 1056 (1987). 
346 U.S. 427 (1953). 
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sis reflects, I think, a world view from the somewhat conceptu- 
al vantage point of an appellate judge. Yet, in my judgment, 
the present securities industry arbitral system is uniquely 
rooted in the day-to-day facts of the special relationship be- 
tween retail securities firms and their customers. It is primari- 
ly that relationship, with the very "human" kind of problems 
that arise, with which the arbitration system was designed to 
deal and for which, I would submit, it remains greatly superior 
to  the judicial system. 
With that in mind, I would like to set out for critical exarn- 
ination a set of factual and policy propositions that illuminate 
the reasons why I believe that both mandatory arbitration and 
the recommendations of the Task Force Report remain the 
right course of action. 
Many investors do not adequately understand investment risk. 
Notwithstanding even good faith efforts, it is difficult to  
communicate the nature of investment risk. Individual inves- 
tors often do not understand the nature of, and ignore warn- 
ings of, investment risk. They are commonly surprised and 
sometimes even outraged when the value of an investment 
goes down. A truly astonishing number of presumptively "so- 
phisticated" investors have difficulty understanding why the 
value of a portfolio of Treasury securities, which carry no cred- 
it risk, decreases when interest rates rise." 
Most brokers are trained and function as salesmen. 
Most importantly, brokers are compensated as sales- 
men-they are paid a commission on revenues. As a conse- 
quence, their financial interest lies in "making the sale" rather 
than in preserving and increasing value over time. The smart- 
er brokers know that the short-term approach is only of short- 
term value, to them as well as to their customers, and that 
pursuing their customers' long-term interests is the best way 
to  maintain the flow of c o ~ s s i o n s .  But many do not under- 
stand that, and their compensation system pushes them in the 
' See generally ~NVEEXhfENT COMPANY INSTITUTE, SHAREHOLDER ASSESSMENT OF 
RISK DISCLOSURE METHOD (1996). 
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other direction. Although the securities laws impose obliga- 
tions of fairness, suitability and disclosure upon brokers in 
dealing with their customers, commission salesmen tend to be 
driven by their compensation system. 
There are some bad actors as well. 
In spite of the efforts of the SEC, the NASD, the New York 
Stock Exchange and the other self-regulatory organizations to 
eliminate the bad apples from the securities industry, there 
always seems to be a small number of them in the industry, 
and their potential for causing damage is out of proportion to 
their numbers. When I was an SEC Commissioner, a small but 
unremitting portion of the enforcement cases involved over- 
aggressive salesmen who had migrated into the securities 
industry from unregulated high-pressure sales roles. And the 
growth of the penny-stock market was fertile ground for this 
group.5 
Customer disputes are inevitable. 
Notwithstanding the honesty and concern for customers 
that characterize most brokers, when the equity markets go 
dom, or when interest rates move up and the value of fixed 
income securities moves down, customer disputes burgeon. 
When dishonest brokers are involved, disputes arise no matter 
how the markets are doing. The reality is that customer dis- 
putes are part and parcel of the retail securities business. 
Many customer disputes are small. 
The NASD now handles about eighty-five percent of all 
self-regulatory organization arbitrations and about seventy-five 
percent of all securities-related arbitrations." That amounts to 
about 6,000 cases per year at the current rate.' Of those, 
about fifty percent involve less than $50,000 in "realn claimed 
See, cg., In re Kenneth J. Schulte, SEC Adminisfmtiue P m d u m ,  1997 
SEC LEXIS 788 (Apr. 10, 1997). 
See TASK FORCE REPORT, supm note 1, at 138. 
' See TASK FORCE REPORT, supm note 1, nt 138. 
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damages (excluding punitive damages). Thus, there are about 
3,000 cases per year involving small amounts in which the 
feelings of the customer run so high, or the securities firm has 
taken such a hard line, that settlement has not been possible. 
There is a significant public policy interest, which is matched 
by the securities industry's interest in maintaining the good 
will of customers, in resolving those cases quickly and at low 
cost. 
The courts are wholly unsuited to deal with the small cases. 
In general, neither plaintiffs nor defendants want to use 
the judicial system for small cases unless it is plainly to their 
advantage to do so. Litigating in court is too expensive, cum- 
bersome and slow. Although Judge Selya cites some interesting 
data for federal courts: most of these cases will be litigated in 
state court, where the docket backlog varies widely from state 
to state. The Supreme Court's decision in Ernst & Ernst v. 
Hochfelder: requiring that a plaintiff show scienter to make 
out a claim under Rule lob-5, has caused many plaintiffs 
counsel to shiR to state courts where the burden of proof is 
often lower. 
Plaintiffs prefer the judicial system in those cases in which 
access to a jury holds out the promise of a large award-and 
thus a large settlement. Cases involving potentially large puni- 
tive damages are the most common example of cases in which 
plaintiffs counsel prefer a jury trial. In contrast, defendants 
prefer the judicial system when their position (as is often the 
case) depends more on the law than on the facts,'' or some- 
times when the greater cost (and the defendant's greater re- 
sources) is an advantage due to  the defendant's deeper pocket. 
When the defendant's case is based upon technical legal provi- 
sions, such as statutes of limitations, they feel disadvantaged 
before arbitrators who often tend to "do equity" for investors 
regardless of the defendant's strict legal rights. 
See TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 1, at 201 (noting that even in Federal 
Court, the NASD arbitration process is significantly faster and much less expen- 
sive). 
425 U.S. 185 (1976). 
lo E.g., "the customer is required to read the warnings in a prospectus," or 
"New York is a true employmenbat-will state." 
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Neither plaintiffs nor defendants should be able 
to choose a forum based on whether the facts of 
the particular case mean one forum would be 
"better" than another. 
Because arbitration is a consensual process, those who 
appeared before the Task Force who ordinarily represent inves- 
tors in disputes with securities firms often took the position 
that consent should be given only at the time the dispute aris- 
es. They pointed out that most securities firms have pre-dis- 
pute arbitration clauses in their new account forms for margin 
accounts. They argued that the pervasiveness of those agree- 
ments amounts to de facto mandatory arbitration, notwith- 
standing the enhanced disclosure recommended by the Task 
Force Report." I agree with that characterization but not 
with the conclusion. Once the facts of a dispute are known, one 
party is likely to know that the judicial system would be a 
better forum for its position, and the other party mill know the 
opposite. Agreement is unlikely, and the forum will be chosen 
not by consent but by default-that is, whatever forum is re- 
quired or permissible in the absence of agreement. The rules of 
the NASD and the other self-regulatory organizations provide 
that, absent a pre-dispute arbitration agreement between the 
parties, the customer can compel arbitration, which means 
that the customer can choose the f ~ r u m . ~  Thus the effect of 
banning pre-dispute arbitration agreements would always be to 
permit the customer to choose the forum. 
I think that greater fairness is achieved if a pre-dispute 
arbitration agreement is signed at a time when neither p m  
knows what kind of dispute will arise and who will benefit 
.from arbitrationB-whether denying the ability of the securi- 
ties iirm to assert legal issues and to beat down the plaintiff 
with endless discovery d l  prove a great benefit to the plain- 
tiff, or denying the ability of a plaintiff to present evidence of 
serious misconduct to a jury will benefit the defendant. By 
l1 "You either sign it, or they don't want your businessP Theodore A. 
Krebsbach et al., Pre-Dispute Arbitmtion Agrwments, 63 FORDHAM L. REV. 1511, 
1519 (1995) (comments of Theodore Eppenstein). 
" NASD, CODE OF ARBITRATION PROCEDURE 5 12(o)(i)(2) (1996); N.Y.SB. GUIDE 
(CCH) Rule 6cc(a) (1995). 
" Cf. JOHN RAIVLS, A T i E O R Y  OF JUSTICE (1971). 
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permitting pre-dispute arbitration clauses we are saying, in 
effect, that in most cases arbitration will be better for both 
sides. It is better because it will be faster and cheaper and, for 
the investors, more equitable than a judicial forum which 
would pay more heed to legal technicalities. 
The process of judicializing the arbitration process 
is at a very early stage. 
Much has been made of the 'legalization" of the arbitra- 
tion process. Indeed, the Task Force Report has a number of 
suggestions, including mandatory discovery, that nudge arbi- 
tration in the direction of the judicial system.14 But the fact 
remains that discovery in arbitration simply bears no relation- 
ship to discovery in the judicial system. There are, for example, 
ordinarily no depositions.15 Document discovery in most cases 
is extremely limited. Judge Selya at  one point seems concerned 
that the things the Wilko Court criticized about arbitra- 
tion-the lack of reasoned and written opinions and of an effec- 
tive appeal, for example--remain defects in the arbitration 
system. Yet, at  the same time he criticizes the legalization of 
the system. We cannot have it both ways, and there is much to 
be said for the proposition that it is the very search for exqui- 
site procedural fairness that has produced a judicial process so 
cumbersome that ordinary people want to  avoid using it for 
dispute resolution. There is no doubt that further legalization 
is inevitable in complicated arbitrations. But the Task Force 
Report was careful to  preserve the old, single-arbitrator, 
streamlined process for cases under $30,000, which would ac- 
count for thirty-five percent of all claim~,'~ and would permit 
the same procedures to apply to claims up to $50,000 with the 
consent of the parties.17 
Similarly, Judge Selya seems to criticize the Task Force 
Report's recommendation for early neutral evaluation-not 
because it is a bad idea, but because it is too much like what is 
used for litigation and, in effect, should not be needed in arbi- 
See TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 1, at 82. 
lS NASD ARBITRATOR'S MANUAL 10 (1992). 
l6 See TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 1, at 72-73. 
" See TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 1, at 75. 
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tration. But arbitration, like litigation, represents a breakdown 
in the ordinary day-to-day human mechanisms for resolving 
disputes. Both sides are often angry and insulted. It is not a 
criticism of the arbitration process that third-party interven- 
tion can be useful in helping the parties to resolve the dispute 
outside of an adversary process. 
In sum, it is simply not the case that the Hotelling Para- 
dox has driven the courts and arbitration into a situation 
where "distinctions blur, and me are left with one dish that, 
while edible, retains none of the spices that distinguished the 
two prede~essors."'~ The fact is that in most cases, all parties 
recognize that arbitration remains faster, cheaper and general- 
ly more fair-and all parties prefer it, except in particular 
cases in which the judicial system presents more individual 
advantage. 
Arbitration is a place to go to have your rights determined. 
Finally, and perhaps most important, too many Americans 
do not regard the courts as a place where it is possible to go to 
have their rights determined. And the determination of those 
rights is the most fundamental social function of the courts. 
Indeed, the pressure for settlement from judges is fierce and 
sends a clear message to litigants about the attitude of the 
courts toward performing this basic function. In the broker- 
customer environment, in which disputes are bound to arise, 
there is thus a critical social function served by an institution 
provided to determine those rights relatively quickly and inex- 
pensively. Arbitration, although heavily subsidized by the secu- 
rities industry, is generally perceived as a fair process to 
achieve that end.'g 
Is Bruce hf. Selya, ArbiMwn Unbound?: The Legacy of hlchlnhon, 62 BROOK. 
L. REV. 1433, 1447 (1996). 
l9 See U m D  STATES GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, ~ECWTLES ARBITRATION: 
HOW INVESTORS FARE 31 (GAOIGGD-92-74) (May 1992). 
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